Swiss and the Nazis Page 15
It was General Henri Guisan, the head of the army, who saw the danger most clearly. When, for the first time, voices started to be raised about an accommodation with Germany, he took matters into his own hands. Bypassing the civilian government, he went directly to the army and, through the army, directly to the Swiss people. On July 25, the general electrified the nation with a clarion call for absolute, uncompromising resistance. He made a dramatic speech with religious overtones to his officers standing assembled at the Rütli meadow, the almost sacred place where the Swiss Confederation had been formed in 1291.35 His speech set the mood and steeled the will for the rest of the war years by appealing to the deepest springs of Swiss patriotism. He cut off potential factional splits and perhaps even the possibility of a move toward accommodation within the army itself. The German envoy in Bern reported the event in an OKW intelligence report:
General Guisan’s call to arms, delivered at the Rütli before his assembled troop commanders, contains surprising declarations. He said Swiss neutrality had been respected by Switzerland’s neighbors until today and would be defended to the death. “As long as millions of men are under arms in Europe and as long as important groups could attack us at any time, the army must and will resist.” The order warned against the dangers of defeatism and reminded those in the audience to believe in their own strength with which Switzerland, with an iron will, would successfully offer resistance. “On August 1 the new positions that I assign to you are where your weapons and your courage will serve your country best under these new circumstances.” There was no obvious reason for this startling manifestation. The Envoy suggests that the Axis powers register a complaint with the Swiss government.36
On July 31 the German High Command again discussed closing off the Nazi-occupied border between France and Switzerland. The Swiss border from Basel to the intersection of the demarcation line southwest of Geneva was considered locked up. From this point on, the Army Command and customs personnel enforced a virtually complete prohibition on border traffic and trade, at least along this line.37 Switzerland was almost completely surrounded.
OKH intelligence continued its reports on Swiss attitudes and defensive preparations. At the end of July 1940, it estimated Swiss troop strength at 220,000 mobilized soldiers. Troops who were released from active duty but remained unemployed were now summoned back into service to construct fortifications. The Germans alleged that, because of the stunning defeat of the British Expeditionary Force culminating in the near-catastrophe at Dunkirk, the attitude in the Swiss army had become increasingly hostile to England, but had not as a result become friendly to Germany.38 Reports show the Swiss continuing to construct and expand fortifications at the northwest border, i.e., across from French territory now occupied by the German Army.39
In its August 1 report, the OKW gave faint hope for a decisive change of attitude in Switzerland. “Where there is border traffic into Germany, the mood of the Swiss border population is slowly changing in our favor, but not on any large scale.” The report continued:
As for the rest, views in Switzerland remain divided over the term “renewal”(Erneuerung). According to our sources, the Swiss are not yet seriously considering giving up their traditional [pro-Allied] allegiances. They do not think that the war has been decided yet. The influential core of the well educated and the industrialists expect England will ultimately come through, even if it takes years. That core still contains many working for remaining French and British interests in the Swiss war industry. They supervise the export to their countries. Some say these agents have nothing to do, but they are very interested in keeping the faith in England and its forces alive in Switzerland. In addition to spreading propaganda for England, these agents are also doing their best to transfer news of all kind back to the Allies. Jewish businessmen in Switzerland have perhaps more foresight. They believe the time has come to try at least to salvage their investments by selling out now.40
As the summer of 1940 wore on, the Swiss realized their fate would most likely be decided by events elsewhere in Europe and by Hitler’s grand strategies. However, the reality of sudden invasion was never far from their minds. One group of Swiss officers, those most radically committed to total resistance, formed a secret association. In event of an invasion, they planned to arrest or kill any Swiss officers who might attempt a pro-German coup or sabotage the resistance. In early August, Commander-in-Chief Guisan learned of this group. He gave its members a slap on the wrist for insubordination but was in tacit sympathy with their views.41 Guisan knew the temptation to surrender to end the inevitably heavy losses and destruction of the country—or even to link Switzerland with a triumphant Reich—would be a deadly fault line. OKW intelligence describes the following factually inaccurate but telling rumor about this episode:
We have been told that at the beginning of August there was a revolt of a battalion of Swiss soldiers in Zurich. Apparently it was directed against officers, and the soldiers demanded that the officers be shot [for pro-German sympathies]. There is noticeable hatred against the authorities and superiors [who counsel “realism” toward Germany]. Apparently commanders are very pessimistic [about the Swiss Army’s chances], and government circles are observing this development nervously. They are said to believe that nihilism and defeatism will spread across Europe.42
With the ending of the war in France, the immediate threat of further hostilities seemed to diminish. By August 3rd, a partial demobilization of the Swiss army was ordered. Keeping men at the front was expensive and disrupted domestic farm and factory production. Older men were dismissed first, and the army was brought down to an active duty strength of 200,000. The Germans noted: “Switzerland has interned polish and French troops, who possibly will fight on the Swiss side against us, reinforcing the Swiss line. But if the interned troops do not fight, then guarding them takes men away from Swiss combat units.” One and a half Swiss divisions were involved in the task of guarding internees. The Germans were also fully aware that the Swiss-French border south of Lake Geneva was still in the hands of the Vichy regime, and must be closed as soon as possible, to block French volunteer forces from moving back into France to harass German troops.43
The Germans continued to play chess with troop movements designed to keep the Swiss off-balance. Every time the Germans could get the Swiss to move units to counter a German feint, they gave away strengths and positions. The Germans kept up this exhausting pressure week after week. An agent from the German Counterintelligence Office in Salzburg gained access to a Swiss lieutenant colonel’s report:
The assembling of troops in the German border area is camouflaged. Trains of soldiers at the border are supposed to be troops on leave, but are in fact troop transports. We have reports that a German army is moving toward the Swiss border, mainly through Burgundy. Switzerland is keeping a very close eye on these troop movements, especially since the extent of these movements is much larger than at any time before.44
In early August, fresh, more detailed, plans to attack Switzerland were prepared again by the same Captain von Menges who did the planning in July. He made a first draft dated August 8 and a final version dated August 12. The plans were divided into two parts: “Der Deutsche Angriff Gegen die Schweiz” (the German attack against Switzerland) and “Der Italienische Angriff” (the Italian attack). 45 The plans included detailed maps showing attacks by infantry, border, motorized and panzer divisions.46 The maps include: Swiss troop positions and fortifications, some with question marks;47 the Swiss defensive line along the French border, from Geneva to Basel;48 available German forces and the German attack plan from Geneva to Lake Constance;49 and the Italian attack plan, including what would become the German-Italian demarcation line splitting up Switzerland.50 This last map of an irredentist redrawing of national boundaries is reminiscent of the carving up of Poland by Hitler and Stalin.
The von Menges blitzkrieg aimed to isolate major Swiss units, preventing them from reinforcing one another or escaping to a for
tified stronghold in the Alps. Once more, his plan detailed lightning moves to seize crucial industrial centers and arms production facilities around Solothurn and Zurich (Orlikon weapons facilities) and to prevent the Swiss from blowing up or otherwise destroying the transportation system. Menges described the Swiss army as having a strength of 220,000 soldiers divided into six infantry divisions, three mountain divisions, three mountain brigades, one border brigade and a border battalion. He knew the Swiss had a weak air force, virtually no anti-tank defense and no panzer troops. Internal politics and civilian unemployment problems were driving an ongoing demobilization and rotation. However, remobilization could take place quickly—in just five hours for the border troops. Menges gave a shorthand assessment of the Swiss army as follows:
Armed forces are functionally organized and capable of quick mobilization. The level of training will have been raised by the long time they have been mobilized. Leaders only theoretically schooled. Inflexible leadership. Shortcomings in weaponry (artillery, tanks, anti-tank defenses, air force, antiaircraft guns). The individual soldier is a tough fighter and a good sharpshooter. The mountain troops are said to be better than those of their southern neighbor. The fighting value of the western Swiss (French type) is limited, while those living south of Constance will be bitter enemies. Summary: an army suitable only for defensive purposes and completely inferior to its German counterpart.
The OKH General Staff regular report for August 16 noted that interned French and polish troops had been moved to eastern Switzerland and parts of several divisions were involved in guarding them. The report notes that the Swiss Federal Council had prohibited the Communist party.51 That was significant to the Nazi planners. Germany was, for the moment, still allied with the Soviet Union, and the Germans were well aware of the role the Communists had played in weakening the French army’s will to fight, contributing to its defeat by the Wehrmacht. The Communists would not play a similar role in the Swiss army.
As conditions stabilized in France, a blitzkrieg against Switzerland came more and more into planning focus. On August 26, General Franz Halder of the OKH High Command ordered preparation of a revised invasion plan to be executed by Army Group C. He knew that “Switzer land is determined to resist any invasion by exerting all her strength.” There had clearly been discussion between Hitler and Mussolini. Halder wrote: “Italy demands the Swiss territory south of the Bernese and Glarus Alps as being in its sphere of interest. Italy is ready to invade this territory if German forces march into northern Switzerland at the same time.” Each army would operate independently, although the usual assumption applied that Italy may request German help, in this case by the advance of shock troops from the Rhone valley to the Gotthard to support Italy’s invasion of southern Switzerland.52
Blitzkrieg rules would apply. “The operation must be built on surprise and speed. We must avoid attracting attention by massing troops at the northern and eastern borders of Switzerland.” The assault must “shatter the forces of the Confederation and occupy as fast as possible the capital Bern with its surrounding industrial area, the armament centers near Solothurn and Lucerne, the industrial area around Zurich, and then the remaining territory in the German sphere of interest.” Most important of all, “the operations must be conducted in such a way that the armed forces of Switzerland are unable to withdraw to the high Alps.” General Halder clearly recognized that, otherwise, Swiss resistance could continue in definitely.
Reports discussed an ever-increasing Swiss food shortage, and brought up the possibility that Switzerland was considering expelling French internees into unoccupied France.53 Six Swiss infantry regiments were required to guard them, and the drain, combined with the granting of leave to over 30 percent of Swiss soldiers, had sunk Swiss troop strength to 120,000. Intelligence detailed the whereabouts of the border brigades, mountain brigades, and various other units. “in the border areas in many cases the road signs and the signs with town names have been removed.”54 Maps were prepared showing the positions of Swiss troops.55 Specially marked were “divisions whose strength was about to be reduced by leaves.”
The intelligence was highly detailed as to troop positions, types, and armaments. It pinpointed mined bridges, camouflaged bunkers and machine-gun nests.56 Rumors were flying about the Réduit or central redoubt, the Alpine region in which Swiss Commander-in-Chief Henri Guisan decided to concentrate his forces to meet a German attack. The actual boundaries of the Réduit extended to the fortified areas of Sargans in the east, St. Maurice in the west, and the Gotthard in the south. In the north, there were a series of fortified areas roughly beginning with the mountains near the Lake of Lucerne. However, German intelligence was greatly mistaken about the Réduit’s boundaries, describing them as follows:
According to some reports, the earlier planned “central redoubt” is supposed to be strengthened for defense. Its borders are generally as follows: course of the Limmat and Aare rivers to the mountain chains of Weissenstein, Chasseral, and Chaumont to Lake Neuchâtel, then between Lake Neuchâtel and Thun and maybe along the Aare River, then along the chain of Lakes of Thun, Brienz, Sarnen, Lucerne, Zug, and Zurich.57
The above mistakenly described what was known as the Army position along the Limmat and Aare rivers which was abandoned to a large extent after the fall of France, and also incorrectly included areas near the Lakes of Neuchâtel and Zurich, when in fact those areas were outside the Réduit. Swiss shock troops were positioned in those locations, but the Réduit was actually centered in the more rugged, inaccessible Alps. A German invasion based on the foregoing faulty intelligence would not have confronted the main body of the Swiss forces.
Attitudes of the Swiss population remained a persistent theme of German intelligence. The OKW report of September 13 noted that “the Swiss considered the German air offensive against England a failure” and that “a British victory was thought to be best for Europe and Switzerland in particular.” it added: “it was also said that public opinion was against Germany with regard to the resistance movements in the French colonies. The Swiss saw these movements as signs of new resistance against Germany, a weakening of the Axis and an increase of England’s chances to win the war.”58
German military attaché Iwan von Ilsemann echoed these conclusions in his report from Bern to the OKH on September 23:
The General may be interested in my impressions about the political developments here in the past three weeks…. The fact that the Germans have not yet tried to land in England has strengthened the hope that England will after all be invincible. In addition, reports from England published in the papers here, which emphasized the strong will to hold out despite considerable damage suffered at the hands of the German Luftwaffe, have apparently had their effect on the Swiss population. Accordingly, the opposition to Germany has increased again, after decreasing considerably following the collapse of France.59
Every major city in Switzerland had pockets of resident Germans, many long-term inhabitants and some openly pro-Nazi. Swiss who spoke the Swiss-German dialect were most attuned to the Nazi threat. The German consul in Lugano wrote that, although Italian-speaking Swiss in Ticino had previously appeared neutral to Germans there, “Germans known to be National Socialists are boycotted or even harassed” now that German-speaking Swiss troops have appeared in the area. As another example, the report cited “the harsh reaction after the reception by the Federal Council of a representative of the Swiss National Socialists.” The report mentioned recent “important visitors—Admirals C[anaris] and p[?].” Canaris was chief of the Abwehr (German Military intelligence).
The OKW information brief for September 24 noted: “The police have published new regulations directed against National Socialists: All Nazi cells are to be eradicated from Switzerland, and Switzerland is to have no relationship with Germany except for commercial connections.” Strangely, the German reports combined sharp factual observation with bizarre, theory-driven analysis. Reports—perhaps with an eye to their pot
ential readers—attributed Swiss hopes for an English victory to the influence of the Freemasons.60
By the fall of 1940, the secret documents captured from the French outlining the defense arrangements between the Swiss and French armies gradually became known. The reactions were duly summarized in German intelligence reports:
The General may be interested in learning that it has apparently become known here that certain documents about French-Swiss general staff meetings in France were found. At least lieutenant General Wille, invited to our house a few days ago with the Envoy and professor Sauerbruch, mentioned to the Envoy that he had received information from several people, but not officially, according to which we had seized documents in France. He said that these documents showed that the Swiss general staff had extensive contacts with the French general staff, constituting a potential violation of Swiss neutrality against the Germans. Wille added that such agreements could only have been made without the knowledge of the Federal Council.61
Since these captured documents could easily be used by the Nazis as an excuse for attacking Switzerland, Wille’s motive appeared to be in part to exonerate the Federal Council by implying that the Swiss general staff acted alone in planning mutual defense with France.
Switzerland was a plum, and German staff officers seemed almost to compete with one another to come up with the winning invasion plan. In fact, however, Hitler typically instructed different operations branches to plan different tasks without informing the branches of competing assignments. At least two plans were prepared in this period quite independently of each other. The first would have utilized Army Group C, while the second utilized the German First Army.