Swiss and the Nazis Page 2

  PART I

  A WAR OF WORDS AND NERVES

  CHAPTER 1

  THE EYES OF GERMAN INTELLIGENCE

  An essential starting point for understanding Switzerland’s politico-military stance during World War II is to see how it was analyzed by contemporary agents of the Third Reich. For this study, exhaustive searches were made in the German military archives for documents pertaining to Switzerland during the time of the Hitler regime.1 The military, diplomatic, and intelligence documents found reveal the intentions and attitudes of both the Germans and the Swiss during these years.

  German intelligence kept a close eye on Switzerland during the entire period of the Third Reich. The Nazi hierarchy saw Switzerland as a land in which the ideals of freedom and federalism posed a threat to their New Order. At various times, operations specialists from the German armed forces made detailed plans for blitzkrieg attacks against Switzerland. Administrators were likewise put to work pre paring a new civil organization for the country once it had been overrun.

  Having seized power in early 1933, Hitler’s first task was to consolidate his regime within Germany itself. A year later, he increasingly turned his attention to other parts of Europe. German diplomatic and military reports coming back to the planning centers began to reflect his priorities and concerns. Germany’s neighbors were all potential enemies. Hitler himself knew that sooner or later there would be war.

  France would be a major target. Switzerland was neutral, but the country offered a relatively direct southern route into France. How the country would respond to German—or French—initiatives was recognized as critical. If the French sensed that a German offensive was imminent, they might move into Switzerland to block it or to counterattack. For their part, the Germans had to know whether the neutral Swiss would allow or support a French attack against Germany’s southern flank, and whether they would oppose German troops moving against France. The French, who in 1923 had occupied the Ruhr over Germany’s non-payment of war debts, had begun to pour the bulk of their defense resources into constructing the maginot line, a massive network of fortifications along the French-German border. Successful as a deterrent against head-on attack, the existence of this line placed new importance on the smaller countries to both the north and south, on whose territory the only mobile operations could take place.

  On April 14, 1934, the German envoy to Bern, Ernst von Weizsäcker, wrote to the ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin that Switzerland saw the peace of Versailles as unfair or unwise but preferred it to a new war. “National Socialism was regarded as warlike.” The Swiss feared that a revived Germany might attack France through Switzerland, moving through Geneva to fall upon the French from behind their maginot line. They would likely annex German-speaking Switzerland in the process. Swiss Foreign Minister Motta told Weizsäcker: “In 1934 there will be no war in Europe. But later?” He wanted to add that France would not wage a preventative war but that, if Germany rearmed, the danger would return.2

  Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had to pay enormous reparations to France and England. But the chaotic aftermath of the Great War, the runaway inflation of 1923, and the Great Depression left the German economy in ruins. Indeed, the Depression left the entire world’s economy in shambles. Disaffected, unemployed workers threatened stability in every country. Hitler sought to repudiate both the reparations imposed by the disgrace of Versailles and commercial debts. As for the latter, Weizsäcker wrote that Germany owed the “bourgeois” Swiss some 21 billion marks.

  Switzerland had to realize that the Nazi regime was securely in place and therefore must accommodate it. As Weizsäcker put it, “Switzer land needed many years in order to get used to Fascism in the south. Likewise she must get used to National Socialism in the north. The Swiss still see as criminal the conversion of their small, democratic Austrian neighbor into a dictatorship, and then how trouble looms westward into France.” (Austria had just become a dictatorship under the rule of Engelbert Dollfuss.)

  Germany’s envoy stressed that two elements of National Socialism were wholly unacceptable to the Swiss: “The Führer principle, for Switzerland is still today built on federalism; and the race principle, because neither race nor Volkstum [folk power] as we think of them holds Switzerland together.” He sought to find common ground between Swiss values and National Socialism based on their mutual opposition to Marxism. However, the Swiss, with their centuries-old resistance to emperors, instinctively opposed the centralized statist regimes they saw in both Germany and the Soviet Union.

  Weizsäcker cautioned that “the total balance admittedly remains negative for the time being,” and that, in a European conflict, Switzerland would lean toward France and against Germany. “Our left flank would be pressed up against a country with 300,000 rifles, which would be ready to be used sooner against us than against France.”

  The Swiss had ample reason to fear German aggression. Their German-speaking region was appearing in Nazi maps of a “Greater Germany,” and an alleged German plan to attack France through Switzerland had been published in Swiss French-language newspapers.3 German Envoy Weizsäcker addressed this propaganda in a note to the ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on June 20, 1934, entitled “Annexation of German-speaking Switzerland: French propaganda, German carelessness.”4 The trouble began as follows:

  After German statements had spread fear last fall that the new Germany was aiming at splitting the Confederation and annexing the German-speaking part of Switzerland, we were able to clear up these fantasies in discussions between the Foreign minister of the Reich and the head of Swiss foreign policy, Mr. Motta, as well as with the publication of the content of these discussions…. For a while, Swiss circles remained nervous because ill-meaning elements had spread rumors about an alleged new plan of Germany to march through Switzerland. After a statement by the War minister of the Reich put out that fire, things calmed down a bit.

  However, “new concerns about German annexation desires” were being stirred up by “a certain French source that is in close contact with the French Embassy here,” and “careless statements by certain German personalities who visited Switzerland about a month ago revived the fear of annexation.” A previously friendly high-ranking Swiss military officer had become an enemy of the new Germany.

  Weizsäcker continued: “While those cases could be explained as being intentionally malicious or just stupid, there can be no excuse for a publication like the one I am sending in the attachment.” He enclosed a map that was included in the June issue of Der Auslanddeutsche (The German Abroad) published by the German Foreign Institute in Stuttgart and the German people’s Association for Germandom Abroad. The map, he exclaimed, “designates German-speaking Switzerland and even areas beyond that as ‘German land withheld or taken away from Germany.’” What was worse, the map was marked as having been reprinted from yet another publication of the new Germany. Similar instances had been noted in a Swiss newspaper. Weizsäcker concluded: “If we keep assisting French propaganda in this manner, we should not be surprised that neither public nor private opinion in Switzerland, even those that are based on good will, show any trust in the new Germany.”

  Weizsäcker appears here less the ideological Nazi than professional diplomat. As events would show, he would waiver between the two roles. In fact, it became ever more clear that the Nazis intended to subvert and annex Switzerland.

  The alleged influence of the French in Switzerland was an important intelligence topic from this period all the way through the war years. The military attaché of the German envoy in Vienna, Austria, reported on July 16, 1934, that he had attended a tournament in Thun, Switzerland, and then stayed in Bern. He claimed to have talked to high-ranking Swiss officers, but his report is based primarily on discussions with the Italian military attaché, who was the source for the following:

  The latter thinks that French influence on the Swiss army is increasing constantly, also within the corps of German-speaking Swiss officers.
Apparently, this influence is promoted with a very skillful anti-German propaganda and in particular because very many Swiss officers are dispatched to French military schools. That has become a permanent institution and has created a certain connection between the two armies. Swiss officers start thinking along French political lines without even noticing it. The fear of National Socialist ideas taking over in Switzerland and threatening the basis of Swiss statehood also fosters anti-German sentiments.5

  To the extent possible, this might be counterbalanced, noted the attaché, by giving Swiss officers more opportunities to learn about Germany and its military. However, “the Italian military attaché was very concerned that the Swiss government would not be truly willing to maintain neutrality in case of war.” The leading officers in the Swiss General Staff, Colonel Combé and lieutenant Colonel Dubois, were extremely friendly toward the French. The French influence was exemplified by a recent decree of the Swiss Federal Council on military training periods, which was based on a decree by French General Clément-Grandcour, director of the war college, Ecole Supérieure de Guerre. The general owned an estate in Switzerland on lake murten and had observed Swiss military maneuvers.

  Swiss lieutenant General Wille, who was considered pro-German (but not pro-Nazi), reportedly had lost influence, while the influence of his successor as chief of arms of the infantry, the pro-French major General Borel, had increased. The Italian attaché quoted Federal president Pilet-Golaz as saying: “Wille is a danger to our neutrality.” However, the German attaché warned against the security danger of forging too close relations with the Swiss. “I have been told confidentially that officers dispatched to Switzerland are speaking too openly to Swiss officers about our armament plans. Apparently they tend to forget that just because Swiss officers speak German they are not necessarily pro-German and that there are numerous connections to the French army.”

  The same German military attaché filed a further report with the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High Command, or OKW) on September 27, 1934, concerning talks he heard at Swiss military maneuvers. In his welcoming remarks, Federal president pilet-Golaz stated that the Swiss had the will to defend their country against any attack. Federal Councilor Rudolf minger, head of the Swiss military Department, and Corps Commander Roost indicated that the situation in Europe was prompting improvements in Swiss national defense.

  Apprehension was expressed that any Italian foothold in Austria would be a threat to Switzerland’s southern front. Fortifications needed to be constructed, he said, on all fronts. A one-sided fortification against Germany ignored the danger that a socialist government at the rudder in France could march against anti-democratic neighbors. “Switzer land must form a hedgehog against all sides,” offering each of her neighbors the assurance of a certain flank in event of an armed conflict, without compromising Swiss neutrality.6 Indeed, there was only a theoretical threat from France. The Swiss spokesmen well knew that the only real threat was from Germany.

  In the mid-1930s, Germany escalated its rearmament program. Well aware of the danger across the border, Switzerland’s militia army was reorganized, modernized, and enlarged. The Swiss public willingly bought defense bonds to support these efforts. German military intelligence carefully watched these developments.7

  A Wehrmacht intelligence report of march 11, 1937, stated that the Führer had publicly “guaranteed unconditional independence and neutrality to Switzerland. The explanation has appeared exceptionally calming in Switzerland. Federal President Motta explained that neutrality is also guaranteed by the league of Nations.”8 Hitler would later make similar assurances to other neutral European states, only to launch unprovoked attacks against them.

  Rabble-rousing Swiss propaganda against Germany was the subject of a report from the German legation in Bern on April 13, 1937, concerning allegations in the Geneva socialist paper Le Travail that Hitler was preparing a war to be unleashed soon at the Czechoslovak border. The German legation protested to the political Department of the Swiss Confederation against the Swiss press influencing public opinion against Germany.9

  This particular prediction came true the following year. The Anschluss of Austria in march 1938 was achieved through intimidation and did not require a war. But the following September Hitler massed forces on the border of Czechoslovakia, and war was avoided only when England and France gave Hitler what he wanted at the Munich conference, causing the dissolution and German occupation of that country. It appeared that small countries could expect no help from the major powers. Switzerland redoubled its military and ideological preparations to avoid a similar fate.10

  Lieutenant Colonel Iwan von Ilsemann was the German military attaché assigned to Bern. He reported regularly to his commanding general in the Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command, or OKH). His report of October 24, 1938, reiterated previous concerns about a Swiss military alliance with France:

  Attached please find a copy of the Envoy’s report concerning “Swiss Neutrality in Times of Tension,” which among other things deals with military issues that I discussed in detail earlier. At the time, my news about certain French advances to clarify Switzerland’s position with regard to a potential march of French troops through that country was not considered appropriate here. The discussion of the Envoy with lieutenant General Wille confirmed, however, that France has in fact taken some steps in that direction. I doubt that they were merely intended as bluff because if they served only bluffing purposes, they would not have been kept secret as anxiously as they were and would have been brought to our attention in one form or another. In addition, [German consul] Mr. Von Bibra by chance a few days ago learned from a Scandinavian diplomat accredited in Belgium that France had taken similar steps in Belgium.11

  Leaks and alleged misrepresentations in the Swiss press continued to infuriate Hitler. The Nazi press waged a relentless campaign against Swiss newspapers. Indeed, members of the Swiss press were openly threatened with death by the German media, and were undoubtedly on blacklists compiled for the time of invasion. Matters that first appeared in intelligence reports spilled over into attacks in German newspapers. The article “Agitation of the Swiss Confederation Against Germany” graced the pages of the Völkische Beobachter (People’s Observer), Hitler’s newspaper, in December 1938.12 It began by noting that Swiss Federal Councilors Baumann and Motta had only pretended to respond to the agitation against Germany:

  So far there have been only words, no actions. The federal government has taken actions, energetic actions, only against pro-German efforts. A wave of persecution of anything suspected of being pro-Third Reich has been tolerated and assisted by the Federal Council in the past months. House searches, confiscations, arrests and prohibitions have been common. Swiss were even considered traitors if they were friendly to a Reich party member.

  On the other hand, neither the Federal Council nor the Cantons have done anything to counter the unbridled agitation and the psychosis of hatred which have seized the Confederation. The Swiss press, such as the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, the Basler Nachrichten, the Nationalzeitung in Basle or the Bund in Berne writes negatively about the Reich without any inhibition and has not been warned or reprimanded. The publishers Europa, Oprecht and Reso [?] are able to print emigrants’ outbursts against the Reich without any problems. A prohibition was issued against the pro German Internationale Presse-Agentur of Franz Burri from lucerne, but in the same place a Jew named Waldemar Curian who converted to Catholicism was allowed to publish his German Letters without encountering any difficulties from the authorities. Nobody has thought of making life hard for the Katholische Internationale Presseagentur in Freiburg either. A group called Youth Action Community has begun to get rid of the “German poison” in books and newspapers flowing into Switzerland. A film association has set up with the same goal. In addition, a volunteer news service directed exclusively against the Reich was set up. This service has a connection to Swiss living abroad, is subject to a certain foreign influence an
d has personal ties to the Bund in Bern, which is part Jewish.

  The Neue Basler Zeitung, which is not particularly pro-German and cannot be suspected of bringing National Socialist thoughts to Switzerland, but is solely trying to be objective toward Germany, has great difficulties. It has been investigated and persecuted, while the Communist paper Freiheit, whose agitation in Germany could not be any greater, has been tolerated. We have even reached the point where a paper that contains nothing but agitation against the Reich, namely the [illegible] am Sonntag, was allowed to start publishing again without the federal government intervening. We could fill many columns talking about the Swiss activities against Germany if we wanted to show how fertile the Confederation is for enemies of Germany and how shamelessly the Swiss neglect their simplest neighborly duties.

  The fact is that Switzerland is more and more becoming a ground for hatred and agitation against the Reich….

  But what the Reich may demand with determination from a small neutral state is that it have an objective and just attitude towards all things German…. [T]he Reich has to demand from Switzerland to stop the shameless agitation that Switzerland has been conducting over the years concerning domestic matters of the Reich. Since the Anschluss of Austria and the Sudetenland have taken place, there have been strange contacts between the [deposed Austrian] Schuschnigg government and Switzerland, and the agitation has become unbearable. We may tell the Swiss with determination that they are no longer neutral if they persecute and condemn everything pro-German, but allow the worst agitators to conduct their activity against the Reich; that there is no neutrality when the Nationalzeitung in Basle openly welcomes the French influence in Switzerland, and the federal government does not even take note of it.