Swiss and the Nazis Page 3
As war approached in 1939, German military intelligence was busy not only gathering information on obvious enemies such as Poland and France, but also obtaining the most detailed knowledge of Swiss defenses. Today, at the German military archives in Freiburg am Breisgau, one may examine a large box filled with numerous local maps showing fortifications and troop dispositions compiled by “Nachrichtendienst Ic: Schweiz” (Intelligence Service Ic [Army Group C]: Switzerland), dated August 18 through December 28, 1939.13
Included are tourist maps, official maps, topographical maps and military maps of all kinds. Intelligence agents drew in pen the positions of machine-gun nests, bunkers, munitions storage points and every other known defensive shelter. To gather this intelligence, German spies and informants were obviously present in every village, town and city. The only reason to gather detailed intelligence of this kind was to prepare for an attack. Swiss authorities, aware of this activity, forbade the sale of maps.
Just a week before Hitler launched World War II by attacking Poland on September 1, 1939, the German legation in Bern reported: “Federal Councilor Motta expressed his joy and gratitude over the categorical explanation of the Führer and Chancellor [Hitler] today to [Swiss] professor Burckhard, that Germany will maintain Swiss neutrality under all circumstances.”14 However, the Swiss were privately not so naïve as to take chances, and continued to prepare for a Nazi invasion.
Once the war started, diplomatic channels were filled with pledges to respect neutrality. The day after Hitler attacked Poland, the German legation in Bern reported that the Italian emissary assured Swiss Federal Councilor Motta that Italy would respect Swiss neutrality. The Germans knew that French General Maurice Gamelin had confirmed respect for Swiss neutrality to the Swiss embassy in paris.15 French Foreign minister Bonnet told the Swiss envoy who handed over the Swiss declaration of neutrality in Paris that the French government would respect the neutrality of the Swiss Confederation and the intactness of its territory pursuant to the treaties of 1815 and supplemental agreements.16 The French statement was particularly appropriate since France had been the last country to invade Switzerland, occupying much of the country from 1798 until Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo. However, diplomatic assurances notwithstanding, it was clear that Switzerland was threatened only by Germany. Germany had not invaded Switzerland since the Swabian War of 1499, but the disregard of the Nazis for what they saw as merely administrative divisions of territory prompted Switzerland to negotiate a secret alliance with France concerning French support in the event of a German invasion.
The German legation reported from Bern on September 6 that “in the Swiss population and also in officer circles, the apprehension is still very great that they will be pulled into the war through France.”17 However, France was not prepared to attack Germany through Switzerland or anywhere else, despite her mutual defense treaty with Poland. Hitler kept his options open in the war of nerves that lasted until the following year.
German intelligence reported on September 18 that the Federal Council had reproached the army’s leadership for not sufficiently fortifying Switzerland’s western border. Thus, the Swiss were now erecting additional fortifications in the Jura mountains so the Federal Council and the military could legitimately maintain that they were prepared to resist an attempted incursion by the French.18 It was only a show, however, to impress the Germans that their southern flank was secure and thus to remove any motivation to pull Switzerland into German war plans. The Swiss stressed their neutrality, but they were in fact seriously preparing for invasion from the only possible enemy: the Germans to their north.
As the mismatched conflict ended in Poland, the German military kept a close eye on and constantly updated maps detailing Swiss defenses. A map first prepared on October 12, 1939, showed nine Swiss divisions, nine border brigades, and three mountain brigades.19 Updates through mid-November, each inscribed with a different colored pencil, indicated changing positions and the demobilization of two border brigades in the south. Question marks at some Swiss troop positions on the map indicate that Wehrmacht intelligence was not perfect. Moreover, German intelligence knew that “the deliveries of armament matériel of different types promised for a long time from France have not arrived.”20
On October 30, the first of a regular series of intelligence reports written by or submitted to the OKW, the Wehrmacht high command, reported the following:
In case of a German attack Switzerland will apply total chemical warfare and use mustard gas. The Swiss troops therefore conduct daily marching exercises and practice attacks with gas masks so that they will be able to keep the gas masks on all day.
All along the border several thousand mines have been put into the grassy soil. They will explode at the slightest touch. In addition, trip wires have been set everywhere.
Should vital locations (train stations, gas utilities, ammunition factories, etc.) be bombarded, all Germans will be immediately interned.21
While it is unclear whether the Swiss actually planned to use chemical munitions, the remainder of the report was accurate. Mean while, the Germans were bristling from anti-German attacks in the Swiss press. Iwan von Ilsemann, the German military attaché in Bern, reported on November 3, 1939, that he complained to lieutenant Colonel Roger Masson of the “Information Section” (actually, espionage section) of the Swiss General Staff Division that military reporters were deviating from “a press attitude worthy of Swiss neutrality.”22 meanwhile, the Wehrmacht itself was hardly staying neutral. It continued to keep close watch on deployment of Swiss forces, preparing detailed maps.23
Swiss arms exports were also closely watched. In its regular intelligence report of November 11, the OKW had this to say about one of Switzerland’s leading arms manufacturers:
a) The Machine Tool Manufacturer Orlikon made deliveries mostly to neutral countries, namely Turkey, yugoslavia, Denmark, and Holland.
b) Delivery contracts have been executed with England with a value of CHF [Swiss francs] 100,000,000 for 20mm anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, mostly for the navy. These deliveries are scheduled to begin in march 1940. Trade negotiations are ongoing between England and Switzerland. England is exerting strong pressure on Switzerland regarding these deliveries and both sides have emphasized that the deliveries will take place no matter what….
c) It is interesting to note that the admiralty is attaching extremely great importance to obtaining 20mm anti-aircraft guns for the navy. We know from discussions with British officers that their current anti-aircraft guns are unable to cope with dive bombers…. The British hope to fill that gap with the automatic rapid-fire 20mm guns.
d) France has received seven [?] Orlikon deliveries since the beginning of the war. There is an order pending worth CHF 80,000,000. It is scheduled to be executed in the spring of 1940 (20mm anti-aircraft guns, airplane cannon, and ammunition).24
German intelligence reports also provide a comprehensive picture of what the Swiss thought of the Third Reich. A remarkably candid assessment was distributed by the OKW with the date of November 17, 1939. It began:25
a) Reliable sources tell us that the Swiss Government is without any doubt neutral and strives to implement the country’s neutrality and the resulting obligations in public life.
b) Reportedly, however, the Swiss population is very hostile toward Germany. People are of the opinion that Germany caused this war with its ruthlessness. After all, the demands for Danzig and the corridor could have been met by way of negotiations. It was not necessary to pull the entire world into disaster.
It was, of course, fully consistent with international law that the government be “formally” neutral while individual citizens favor one or the other side. Official political neutrality was necessary for Switzerland’s survival, but the Swiss people were anything but neutral, as the OKW recognized. The report continued:
The Swiss population believes that Germany is alone responsible for the inconveniences and the financial damages caused b
y its mobilization. For these reasons, 90% of the population has a negative attitude toward Germany, 5% are indifferent, and at best 5% have a positive attitude.
The prevalence of negative attitudes toward Germany would only increase in 1940, when France collapsed and Switzerland be came surrounded by the Axis. Similar statistics would be suggested by correspondents from the Allied countries. The intelligence report continued:
Reports show that the 5% with a positive attitude toward Germany would have to fear for their jobs should they in fact dare to support Germany. Reich citizens are reportedly called bad names such as “Sauschwob” [Swabian pig] and “Nazihund” [Nazi dog], and German business people are threatened with boycotts. In the recent past, a number of such upright Germans have been expelled from the country. The 140,000 Reich Germans currently living in Switzerland are considered dangerous because under pressure from the Reich they identify with Hitlerism. Neither French nor British citizens have this problem because their home countries do not exert any similar influence.
Again, this intelligence report prepared by Germans for Germans frankly acknowledges Swiss rejection of Nazism. (For their part, the Swiss were alert to the threat of a fifth column posed by citizens or foreign residents with Nazi sympathies.) Reflecting the attitude of their regime, the German intelligence report would naturally be incomplete without an anti-Semitic attack: “Jewish emigrants in their blind hatred are inciting people against anything German and, of course, they are not open to objective arguments.” This charge would escalate throughout the war. Goebbels’ propaganda machine regularly attacked Switzerland as a land of “mountain Jews” and under Jewish influence.26 The report continued: “Sources tell us that the hatred against Germans is so great that Swiss driving German cars are exposed to insults.”
Press censorship was adopted by Swiss authorities both to decrease the chances of provoking a Nazi attack and to prevent disclosure of information useful to the Germans. At the same time, the military was making all efforts in preparation to resist an attack. The intelligence report stated:
c) We have learned that the Federal Council is striving to impose neutrality on the press. General Guisan recently warned the press in this regard and threatened censure should the press fail to comply.
Reportedly, the press showed a certain reluctant restraint after that, but the tone toward Germany was still spiteful and nasty. Reuter and Havas are dominating the newspapers. The German press Bureau is represented almost exclusively with army reports. As for the rest, news favorable to Germany is weakened or not reported at all.
Reportedly, Paris Soir appears daily with an edition of more than 100,000, while the German press is allegedly able to sell only 300 papers a day. The only paper sympathizing with Germany, the Neue Basler Zeitung, reportedly has few readers in Switzerland. Swiss papers carrying German pictures are in danger of being canceled.
d) Given the population’s attitude, German propaganda is showing little effect. According to the reports, the Swiss simply do not believe the Germans anymore and even think that the German radio is lying.
Through their choice of newspapers, Swiss citizens were expressing their sympathy toward the Allies and antipathy toward the Nazis, whose propaganda was failing. The OKW report continued with the following concerning the military:
e) The attitude of the Swiss general staff toward Germany reportedly is not unfriendly. The officers were very impressed with [Germany’s] successes in Poland. We have, however, learned that the Swiss military routinely refers to the Führer using the most obscene terms. A recently issued army decree threatens persons who insult foreign heads of state with draconian punishment so that the public grumbling should stop.
Some members of the Swiss general staff were admittedly oriented toward Germany and proven German military theories, albeit not toward Nazism itself. However, the Swiss army command saw the danger and sought to weed out or transfer such officers to positions where they would not pose a risk to Swiss resistance or to sensitive information. The German report does not mention a Swiss-French alliance, which the Germans strongly suspected. Most telling is the comment that, despite official orders, military personnel continued to insult Hitler. In any case, while formal press censorship was a filter for negatives, it could not force the Swiss to print pro-German stories. Moreover, it would not and could not curtail negative comments about Hitler by individual soldiers and citizens. The report continued:
f) Reports show that Poland enjoys great sympathy all over Switzerland. In order to help, some Swiss have set up a charitable organization called “Pro Polonia.” According to information received, the press keeps describing the destruction of Warsaw caused by the German bombardment and the suffering of the Polish population. This, too, shows the attitude set against Germany.
g) France and England are said to be appreciated because the Swiss reportedly assume that Switzerland will retain its current size if the Western forces win, while they fear that the Germans-peaking part of Switzerland will be annexed by Germany if Germany wins.
As noted, since Hitler came to power, the more rabid Nazis had been printing maps showing Switzerland as part of “Grossdeutschland” (Greater Germany). German intelligence thought such carelessness was needlessly provoking to the Swiss. In fact, a 1939 Swiss publication entitled “Gau Schweiz” (a Gau meaning a Nazi administrative district) compiled several such maps and Nazi threats of annexation to show where Nazi plans were heading.27 Concerning the Hitler-Stalin agreement, the OKW report noted: “The Russian-German friendship pact had a similarly unfavorable effect, particularly in church circles. Those circles are speaking of a pact with the devil.”
This November 17, 1939, intelligence report ends with a pithy summation of the prevailing mood in Switzerland after the fall of Poland:
Frankreich Wird geliebt, France is loved,
England bewundert, England is admired,
Deutschland gehasst. Germany is hated.
No doubt Hitler himself read some of these reports, reinforcing his animosity toward Switzerland. The continuing resistance of a Germans-peaking population that should have had a natural affinity to the Reich, the absence of any significant pro-Nazi political elements within Switzerland, and what he regarded as Swiss duplicity frustrated and angered him. As the year 1940 approached, however, he had bigger fish to fry. His underlings in OKW intelligence were given responsibility for dealing with Switzerland, and intelligence reports continued to pour in. This one is from November 29:
Based on our extensive experience, the current Swiss neutrality is a neutrality of the state, not of the people. Even if the Federal Council tries to convince the Swiss press to adopt the official policy of neutrality, the press nevertheless goes its own way.
According to the reports, the English-Jewish influence on the newspapers is very strong because the large Swiss papers are paid by the British and also because Freemasonry plays a large role. We should not overlook that the Freemasons are a branch of the English Freemasons. It is well known that the latter are working closely with the English “Intelligence Service,” the far-reaching espionage organization.28
The report complained that English influence affected the Swiss justice system and the police, and that the policies of the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland “have nothing to do with neutrality.” No specifics are stated, but this could refer to actions against Nazi organizations. Further, the report alleged, regulations provided that all incoming newspapers were supposed to be inspected when they cross the border. However, “German newspapers are held back and sometimes forwarded to their destination after a wait of ten days, while French newspapers are hardly even checked and are sent through in their entirety.” Further, “British newspapers are confiscated only in exceptional cases.”
An OKW report by lieutenant Colonel Jacobsen dated January 10, 1940, stated that the mood seen in Swiss mail (obviously some snooping was taking place) could be expressed: “One waits.” The general attitude against Germany was accom
panied by the hope for an English victory. A Swiss border soldier wrote that he was concerned about unemployment in Switzerland and added, “When I think of the future, it does not seem good to live in Switzerland, one does not know what will come, Germany and Italy have us fully in hand.” The greater part of the populations in the neutral countries were favorable to England because she remained defiant and to France out of old sympathies.29
As to the Hitler-Stalin pact, the German Army High Command, OKH, wrote to German military attaché Iwan von Ilsemann in Bern on January 13, 1940, about rumors in Switzerland that Germany was sending large numbers of officers to Russia. The attaché was told to deny the charge but not to “create the impression that we are bluntly distancing ourselves from the Russians. The leitmotif remains that with our new relationship to Russia we have crushed the planned encirclement. Russia is a welcome economic partner, and we have a non-aggression treaty, but no military treaty.”30 That last comment would be proven false after the war, when it was discovered that Hitler and Stalin had agreed to dismember Poland.
In January 1940 the Army printing Office in Berlin published the pocket book Schweizerisches Heer (The Swiss Army). In mid-month, the OKH General Staff, Division of Foreign Armies West, wrote to Army Group C (Ic) that it would shortly receive a quantity of the book. It was to be distributed as follows:
Army Group C 10 copies