Swiss and the Nazis Page 4

  Army Headquarters 7 (and army troops) 50 ``

  Corps Command XXV (and corps troops) 40 ``

  96 Infantry Division (up to and incl. battalions) 30 ``

  50 Infantry Division (up to and incl. battalions) 30 ``

  205 Infantry Division (up to and incl. companies) 150 ``

  260 Infantry Division (up to and incl. companies) 150 ``

  460 copies31

  The books were promptly sent.32 The need to prepare the troops for an invasion of Switzerland was the only reason to distribute such a book in such a quantity. Army Group C was positioned at the Swiss border and, as will be seen, would be assigned the task of preparing for an attack on Switzerland later in the year.

  Much of the planning turned on the disposition and intent of what was thought to be the much more powerful French army. The Germans were highly suspicious of cooperation between the French and Swiss. An officer in the 260th Division—one of those listed above—reported on January 31 about French-Swiss contacts. A Frau Brugger returned from Rheinfelden, Switzerland, and revealed having seen a black car with French tags in an area not accessible to the public near the Rhine bridge. Inside were two French officers wearing tall, dark-blue caps and four Swiss officers with steel helmets.33 The report was repeated up the chain of command by Army Group C.34

  A top-secret “Case Switzerland” was submitted by the Operations Division Ia, Army Headquarters, on February 9, 1940. It was entitled “Overview of probable measures to be taken by Army High Command 7 in the case of a French invasion of Switzerland.”35 Under Case A, “Switzerland resists the French.” “In Case A we would not have to expect the French forces to rush to the Reich border. German troops would probably invade Switzerland. It is impossible to set a time frame for possible necessary measures.” Switzerland would become a battleground.

  Under Case B, “Switzerland does not resist the French or joins them.” This could happen “after a short or longer period of tensions” or “as a surprise with no preceding period of tensions.” Case B “is the most likely scenario. Accordingly, preparatory measures that could be executed partially or entirely during the period of tension must be shortened as much as possible. Operational measures, which must be taken at the latest at the beginning of the French invasion of Swiss territory, should be ordered as soon as possible.” The Operations Division was directed: “Order to fight if enemy attacks Reich territory from Switzerland.”

  As a result, the Wehrmacht monitored Swiss troop positions ever more carefully so as to be able to attack on short notice. Among the surviving German invasion plans is a map dated February 5, 1940, drawn on tracing paper, showing the Swiss forces in red and black pencil, including any that were demobilized.36 Accompanying it is a large map of southwestern Europe on which the tracing paper map was placed. Such small maps could be changed regularly to provide the latest updates on targets and objectives for actual battle plans.

  Giuseppe Motta, a member of the Federal Council who sought to maintain an even-handed neutrality in foreign affairs, died on January 23, 1940. Despite the fact that Motta supported the suppression of Nazi groups within Switzerland, the German Foreign Office in Bern sent Berlin a pessimistic report saying that the country would become even more anti-Reich now that the moderate Motta was gone: “That the Swiss public sides with the Western forces and the authorities allow this to happen can be explained primarily by the fact that the authorities themselves are convinced that Germany will ultimately lose.”

  The military attaché noted that since 1933 Switzerland had been fearful of the German Reich. The Reich’s increasing display of power and the influence of the National Socialist philosophy on the German population led to an intentional Swiss policy to isolate itself from the Reich. Fueled by the left, the Swiss movement against National Socialism, and by implication against the German people, was taken up by the entire Swiss population.

  German political leaders tried to stop this development. “The Führer had repeatedly made representations about the inviolability of Switzer land. However, to allow a basic discussion of the relationship between the two countries, the Germans insisted that the Swiss government control the Swiss press.”

  The report alleged that before he died Federal Councilor Motta understood that it was necessary to make public opinion less poisonous against the Germans. When one issue or another became hot in the press, he repeatedly intervened with official declarations that sought to cool things down. However, Motta was not, by and large, successful.

  Beginning in 1939, due to his illness, Motta was forced to become less active politically. According to the German envoy, in the winter of 1938–39, Motta also began to change his mind and to disapprove of German policies. As a firm enemy of Communism, he could not understand why the Germans entered into a treaty of non-aggression with the Soviet Union. The envoy noted that, for years, Switzerland’s “good neighbor” policy toward Germany had its best and perhaps its only supporter in Motta. His death could only mean the end of an already weak hope that a single strong personality with political vision could maintain a good German-Swiss relationship, even during war.37

  In both intelligence and agitation, the Soviets were useful to the Germans. Particularly in socialist-oriented France, Soviet-backed organizers and agents were to prove very effective in undermining the morale of French troops. As revealed in an OKW intelligence report dated February 16, 1940, “The Communist propaganda is said to be extremely skillful and to have reached the most advanced [French] lines. Soldiers apparently find leaflets in all kinds of locations. Officers look for the distributors, but are unable to find them. Most likely they are soldiers themselves.”38

  The same OKW report noted that the Swiss federal government decreed that the export of any kind of war matériel to foreign countries now required a special permit. The Swiss were moving increasingly toward wartime control measures. It also stated that the Federal Council determined that a German edition of the banned book Guillemots’ Conversations with Hitler (Gespräche mit Hitler) by Hermann Rauschnigg had been published in Switzerland, contrary to a statement made in the book. Apparently, the Federal Council decided to confiscate that edition.39

  Meanwhile, German intelligence was making every effort to extract information on French forces from Swiss officers. Iwan von Ilsemann, German military attaché in Bern, discussed the problem in a letter to his commanding general dated February 17, 1940. Even assuming that the Swiss general staff was informed about the French forces on all fronts and about operational reserves, only a very small circle would have this knowledge. “These officers will, however, be particularly unwilling to inform German representatives. In addition, officers who used to belong to the army staff and were especially interested in good relations with the Germans were recently transferred elsewhere.”40

  To the chagrin of von Ilsemann, Swiss officers who previously had been friendly “deflected all attempts at steering the discussion to military details in France…. Further, we cannot help but notice that since the beginning of the war Swiss officers have avoided being alone with Germans.” Indeed, they would not meet with representatives of the envoy. The attaché observed that the Swiss saw Germany as the enemy: “Without any doubt, the main reason is that even officers who so far had not participated in the campaign against Germany and whose hearts may be on the German side even today cannot avoid their country’s mood. Germany, after all, is its only conceivable enemy.”

  The attaché noted that Admiral Canaris, the chief of Germany’s military intelligence agency, the Abwehr, discussed the issue with Herr von Bibra, counselor to the envoy, and von Chamier, the press counselor. Bibra thought he might obtain information from certain Czechs and poles, who would be bribed with guarantees that their former possessions in Bohemia or Poland would be preserved. “Chamier has close relationships with the so-called Swiss Frontists who have, however, lost their importance and do not include any high-ranking officers anymore.” The Frontists, supporters of National Socialism, had be
en weeded out. In short, the Swiss would not be sources of intelligence on the French forces.

  A February 22 memorandum from Army High Command 7 to the Command of Army Group C concerned “T” measures—the abbreviation for Täuschung, meaning “deception.” It covered Wehrmacht troop movements in southern Germany:

  The execution of the T [deceptive] measures last week has proven that [news] about large military movements or even just rumors about planned military measures from the area south of the line between Freiburg and Donauechingen reach the French intelligence service within 2 to 3 days by way of Switzerland. There is no doubt that this happens because of the more than 2,000 commuters crossing the border daily in the sector between Basle and Constance.41

  In a follow-up to the above, Army High Command 7 reported the interception of a French message sent over a transmitter identified as “Rennes.” The intercepted message said that German agents in Zurich had spread the rumor of a German offensive to be initiated soon, along the Rhine, but that deployments of German troops had not changed. The same German report also stated that the Swiss General Staff did not anticipate a German attack against France through Switzerland. That was factually incorrect and could well have been a rumor circulated by the Swiss. In any event, the intelligence report concluded that “T” measures worked only when corroborated by observations in the field.42

  On march 8, 1940, as invasion plans against France were moving into high gear, the German Frontier protective Force Sector Command reported that 70,000 Swiss troops had been called to arms. Officers with pro-German sympathies had been removed, and preparations had been made at the German-Swiss frontier to facilitate the march of French troops through Switzerland. “Not only the press but also the Swiss government are inciting the Swiss population against Germany. The Swiss think that the field of operations between the warring forces will be between lake Constance and Basle.”43 That is, of course, along the Swiss border with Germany.

  A few days later, the same headquarters reported that an informant returning from Switzerland had stated: “From the Finnish defeat, the Swiss population has concluded that in case of war England and France will abandon Switzerland.”44 Even so, the Swiss were greatly inspired by the manner in which tiny Finland had held out against vastly superior numbers of Russian troops for so long. They knew that the hope of receiving help from the West was illusory. Poland had gotten no support, despite the fact that she had a mutual defense agreement with both England and France.

  On march 26, the German commander at lake Constance reported that the troops of Swiss border brigades 6 and 7 stationed opposite his position had been replaced. The towns behind the border were more densely occupied than before. He sensed an entirely anti-German sentiment among the population:

  The mood in Switzerland is everywhere strongly against us. The press is in large part responsible. Parts of the population are suffering from a delusion of persecution! Basically Germany is made responsible for everything. Sometimes the Germans are said to be coming from the north across the Rhine, sometimes through Vorarlberg (see article in the newspaper La Suisse). People do not expect any danger from the West!45

  Concern about Swiss-French cooperation was again the topic of a report by German military attaché von Ilsemann on April 8. While General Guisan and other officials apparently denied any connection, the report noted:

  Nevertheless, rumors persist about unilateral agreements of the Swiss military with the French. Recently, someone even alleged that General Guisan had met with General Gamelin the month before. Neither the Envoy nor I believe this to be true. [Air Attaché Friedrich] Hanesse, however, who does not think too highly of the Swiss anyway, is convinced that the allegations are true.

  From all I have heard I think it plausible that there have been certain discussions between the Swiss and French military. But those discussions probably covered only any assistance the French might provide in case the Germans attempt to march through Switzerland, something that is still believed possible here.46

  Von Ilsemann expressed gratitude that his requests to send “a competent intelligence officer to G.”—apparently Geneva—had been followed. “F. Will be very useful in that location…. It is very important to obtain more detailed records on the French and English reserves.”

  What von Ilsemann knew of the coming offensive is not known. But as the uncertainties of winter gave way to spring 1940 in this war of nerves, Hitler was putting all his military assets at risk with a sudden, massive attack to flank the northern—not southern—end of the Maginot line. All hell was about to break loose.

  CHAPTER 2

  HANGING HITLER IN SATIRE

  From Charlie Chaplin’s The Great Dictator and the Three Stooges’ You Nazty Spy to the underground Russian Samizdat satires, humor has been a powerful weapon against the bombast of totalitarian rulers. After the rise of Adolf Hitler, the ability of the Swiss population to ridicule the pretensions of the Nazis—combined with defensive preparations and the ability of Swiss soldiers to shoot straight—was an important part of resistance to the Axis. It also infuriated Hitler and his circle, who never quite managed to silence this Swiss laughter once and for all.

  Hitler did make many attempts to “shut up” the Swiss. German diplomats and agents in Switzerland before and during the war made constant complaints—often brazen threats—against what they considered Swiss violations of neutrality. From newspaper articles and speeches to plays and satires, the Germans monitored expressions of Swiss independence and put pressure on Bern to suppress them. The Swiss government had to walk a narrow line between offending its own high-spirited patriots or the ranting Nazis to the north.

  This chapter examines the two leading sources of satire in Switzerland which—in the face of shrill German protests—lampooned and infuriated the Nazis. One was the Nebelspalter, Switzerland’s leading magazine of humor and political cartoons since 1875. It took no prisoners, publishing hugely popular caricatures of the totalitarian systems of both Germany and Russia. Cabaret Cornichon was the other. Its writers and actors kept audiences in stitches with rollicking live performances that openly mocked the pretensions of the Third Reich, even in the darkest days.

  Nebelspalter was published weekly. It roared at both the Brown (Nazi) and Red (Communist) totalitarians. Nebelspalter’s political cartoons were so insulting to Hitler and Stalin that it is difficult to understand why the magazine was not censored, or even banned as overly provocative. Following are descriptions of a few examples, identified by date.1

  August 1932: Months before the Nazis even came to power, a cartoon depicts a ghastly spider with a swastika spinning a web around a cadaverous human. The caption: “Biology. Among all spiders it is the swastika spider which weaves the most beautiful webs.” In Germany itself, such a barb would have been sufficient to get the creator beaten up—or killed—and his offices firebombed.

  June 1933: Hitler is now in power. Storm Troopers hurl rocks labeled “Nazi propaganda,” “anti-Semitism,” and “Fascism” at a woman protecting children under an overcoat with a Swiss cross. The caption reads: “Helvetia has to assume new duties as a mother!” This was an early warning that Switzerland must resist the dangerous ideology to the north.

  October 1933: “Germany’s Rise” portrays brownshirts marching, concentration camps, hypnotized masses, and rotting corpses. “By way of Gleichschaltung [a Nazi term meaning ‘forcing into line’] of shirts, countryside and brains,” the caption says, “the path leads to the next real and final Gleichschaltung.” This foresaw the grisly events that would take place in the future.

  November 1934: A marching black swastika in step beside a marching red hammer-and-sickle, both with boots, are accompanied by a poem:

  Though the black child feels unease

  Beside her big red bravo,

  Her flirting manner tells her heart,

  We’re sure it is not sorrow.

  This pair is clearly heaven-starred,

  The wedding comes tomorrow!
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  Once again, Nazis and Communists are shown marching toward common totalitarian goals. Amazingly, Nebelspalter seems to have anticipated the Hitler-Stalin pact a half decade later which formed the basis for the attack on Poland and the beginning of World War II.

  July 1935: A threatening fist with swastika shakes at a small man wearing a milking hat with Swiss cross. The caption: “Since you clench your fist against me all the time, I think I’d better roll up my sleeves.” And a sub caption: “All Swiss newspapers are prohibited [in Germany]! Consequently Switzerland banned the German newspapers—the Reichsdeutsche, the Alemanne, and the Stürmer.” Nazi Germany’s banning of Switzerland’s newspapers provided a convenient opportunity for Switz er land to protect herself by keeping out the most strident organs of Nazi propaganda.

  November 1937: Hitler and Mussolini with knives and forks have the globe on their dinner table. “Intimate issues being considered. ‘… do you think we can manage this steak?’” Nebelspalter again saw the handwriting on the wall, in this case the pact of Steel of May 1939, in which the Führer and the Duce joined in a military alliance.

  July 1938: The flags of Germany and Italy as well as the other major powers seem to overwhelm a boy waving a small Swiss cross. “Don’t be shy, little Hans. It’s not the size of your flag that matters!” The Anschluss of Austria had recently taken place, and Switzerland was in her traditional David against Goliath role.

  November 1938: A jester redraws a picture of a frowning Hitler into a demonically smiling Hitler at the prodding of a sinister advisor. The caption: “Drawing lessons. ‘More charm, please.’” The impetus for this cartoon was the Munich agreement, in which British prime Minister Neville Chamberlain agreed to Germany’s annexation of the western part of Czechoslovakia.

  December 1938: In the aftermath of the anti-Jewish Kristallnacht (Night of the Broken Glass), Nazi propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels sits in an easy chair pushing buttons on automatic devices for “concentration camps, inquisition chambers, expropriation, deprivation, outrage, pogroms, and asset confiscation” as well as “Gleichschaltung” and “elimination.” The seeds of war and genocide had been planted.